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Dedication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my family, my friends, my partner, and my City. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Chère Nouvelle Orléans, patrie de ma jeunesse, berceau de quelques-uns 
de mes ancestres, tombeau d’un grand nombre de ceux que j’ai aimés.  Je 
demande à Dieu de te protéger, de te garder, de te bénir” 
 
- Hélène D’Aquin Allain (1868) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(“Dear New Orleans, home of my youth, cradle of many ancestors, tomb of 
many I have loved.  I ask of God to protect, to preserve and to bless thee”)
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Abstract 
 
 On August 29, 2005 the most destructive natural disaster to ever 
befall the United States made landfall initially near Buras, Louisiana and 
then ultimately near the mouth of the Pearl River.  The associated storm 
surge caused New Orleans’ protective levee system to fail, inundating the 
City with brackish floodwaters for weeks on end.  This was not the first 
time the City of New Orleans was crippled by disaster.  In 1788 and 1794, 
the city suffered two major fires; the first burning 856 buildings and the 
second 212.  These were significant losses in a city that had a building stock 
of approximately 1,000 buildings before the events.  By recognizing the 
lessons learned in the earlier reconstructions of New Orleans, we can gain a 
better understanding of the rebuilding process that may forever effect the 
physical and cultural environments in the City of New Orleans.
 viii
Chapter I 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, much has been said about the 
potential for resilience in the City of New Orleans.  It is important to note 
that since it was founded in 1718, the City has faced large scale disasters 
and emerged from them to steadily grow and develop intoa bustling 
metropolitan area, becoming the New Orleans of myth and legend.  This 
thesis will examine the Great Fires of 1788 and 1794, both of which 
consumed vast areas of New Orleans; in comparison with the events of 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the events and recovery of 
the eighteenth century fires and to examine the lessons that can be learned 
for the Post-Katrina rebuilding of New Orleans.  While it is impossible to 
directly compare the lessons learned or the disasters, the primary intent is 
to show general trends that occurred in the rebuilding of the City in the 
eighteenth century and how those trends can inform those currently faced 
with recovery challenges in the City of New Orleans. 
 There are numerous parallels between the disastrous fires of 1788 
and 1794 and Hurricane Katrina.  Among these being the methods of 
governmental response and the shifting footprint of the city, or at least the 
potential for shifting.  Beyond these similarities are the actual scenarios 
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that were presented to the populace in the days, weeks and months 
following the occurrence of the disasters. 
The first portion of this document recounts the fires of the late 
eighteenth century; the physical destruction, the response of the 
government, and the patterns of redevelopment in New Orleans’ Vieux 
Carré and the development of the surrounding area.  This is followed by a 
look at the significance of the disasters on the development of the city, both 
culturally and physically.  Finally, I will compare the effects of the fires of 
1788 and 1794 on the initial development of New Orleans and the 
rebuilding thereafter, to the catastrophic events of Hurricane Katrina and 
the subsequent recovery and rebuilding of a Great American City at the 
dawn of the twenty-first century. 
Much of this document is dedicated to providing the history of New 
Orleans, specifically the events surrounding the fires and the response of 
the city leaders in the aftermath.  Through the many histories of New 
Orleans that have been produced over the years, there has not been much 
attention paid to these catastrophic events that occurred only seventy years 
after the establishment of the city.  The Fire of 1788 has received more 
attention in history, but the Fire of 1794 is generally either grouped with 
the first fire or only mentioned in passing.  One goal of this thesis is to give 
attention to these disasters, and to explore how the lessons learned from 
fire can parallel the lessons that should be learned from flood. 
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Of the many histories of New Orleans that were reviewed in 
preparation for this project, the most extensive coverage was provided by 
Henry Castellanos’ New Orleans As It Was, and this coverage consisted of 
the inclusion of the letter Governor Miro wrote to the King of Spain in the 
immediate aftermath of the Fire of 1788 to demonstrate the immense need 
of the colony’s inhabitants.   
The key source of investigating the governmental response to these 
disasters was found in the records of the Cabildo, which was the governing 
council in New Orleans under the Spanish regime.  These records served as 
the ‘minutes’ of the Cabildo meetings, and the official record of what was 
happening in the colony.  The benefit of finding this primary source 
information was that it revealed the actions of the Cabildo, recorded for 
posterity, and the correspondence between the colony and officials of the 
Crown, all entered into this official record.  This allowed the researcher to 
not only gain a better understanding of the Cabildo, but also the limitations 
that the officials of New Orleans were faced with.  These records were 
translated from the original Spanish by the Works Progress Administration 
in 1939. 
Hurricane Katrina ravaged New Orleans on August 29, 2006 just 
over a year before the final preparation of this document.  With that being 
said, there is very little literature available relating to governmental 
response, other than the reports prepared by the government itself.  Also, 
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history has not had a chance to truly see the implications of decisions that 
were made, and continue to be made that will forever steer the course of 
the City of New Orleans.  Statements made relating to the current state of 
affairs in New Orleans come from these governmental sources, as well as 
from the personal experience of living in Post-Katrina New Orleans.   
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Chapter II 
The Fire of 1788 
 The date was March 21, 1788; in the private chapel of colonial 
treasurer Don Vicente José Nunez.  His residence, at the corner of 
Toulouse Street and Chartres Street (then Conde Street) became the 
epicenter of the destruction that was to ensue.  The fire began at 1:30 pm, 
when an unattended candle fell into the lace dressings on his altar.  Within 
five hours, eight hundred fifty-six (856) buildings were destroyed in a 
colonial city that was comprised of approximately 1,000 buildings on 
March 20, 1788 (Castellanos, 238; King, 129). 
 While it has been determined that the fire started because of the 
carelessness of one individual, the destruction is primarily attributed to 
ceaseless southerly-to-southeasterly wind.  According to the official 
account of the fire by Governor Miro “a wind from the south, then blowing 
with fury, thwarted every effort to arrest [the fire’s] progress” (Castellanos, 
238).  At the time of the fire, the City government had in its possession two 
water pumps to be used for combating fire, and six grappling hooks.  The 
two pumps were destroyed by the fire, and the six grappling hooks were 
not found among the debris (Cabildo, 21).  During this period, contrary to 
popular belief, the buildings and residences in New Orleans were not built 
within close proximity to one another.    The expeditious spreading of the 
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fire can be attributed to the gale-force winds and wooden construction 
(O’Connor, 32-33).   
 Approximately eighty percent (80%) of the colonial city had been 
reduced to ashes in a matter of hours.  Among the structures lost were the 
parochial church, the presbytery, municipal buildings, military barracks 
and the public jail.  The Ursuline Convent, Royal Hospital, Custom House 
and the Governor’s building were among those saved from the fire.  The 
buildings that survived the blaze did so more by a matter of positioning 
than through any active fire-fighting efforts of the population.  Those 
structures along the levee and to the west of Conti Street were out of the 
path of the wind-blown flames that consumed the rest of the colony 
(Castellanos, 238-9; O’Connor, 33).  Also destroyed in the blaze were 
twenty-one bridges in various locations throughout the city (Cabildo, 29). 
 As part of the letter sent by Governor Miro to the King of Spain, 
there was a rough illustration of the fires destruction.  Figure 2.1 shows a 
refined version of that map which was dispatched to the King of Spain.  
The darker squares represent those areas that had been developed with 
structures built upon them.  The lighter shaded squares are areas that had 
not been developed but were included in Pauger’s original plan for the City.  
This illustration better represents the extent of the destruction wrought by 
this fire than words describing the boundaries.  While the destruction was 
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limited to roughly half of the area of the City, eighty percent (80%) of the 
settled area was destroyed (Castellanos, 241). 
Figure 2.1:  Plan showing the boundaries of the great Conflagration of New Orleans on 
the 21st of March, 1788. 
 
             Source: The Historic New Orleans Collection  
Amazingly, no lives were lost in the fire.  The Gazette des Deux-Ponts 
printed a first hand account of the fire in August of 1798, in which the 
devastation of the fire was described as “an affliction so cruel and so 
general, the only thing that can diminish out grief, is that not a man 
perished” (King, 129).   
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Response to the Fire of 1788 
On the evening of March 21, 1788, as the flames subsided, the work 
of recovery and aid began.  Governor Miro related his relief efforts to His 
Majesty, the King of Spain Charles III (Carlos III, Rey de España).   In his 
detailed account of the disaster he states: 
To alleviate in part their immediate wants, camping tents were 
distributed to those who applied for them and we agreed to 
distribute daily one ration of rice, on your Majesty’s account, 
to every one, without distinction, who solicited the same.  The 
number of these persons amounts to 700 who will continue to 
be provided for during the continuance of their extreme 
necessities (Castellanos, 241-2). 
 
Governor Miro goes on to report that those families whose homes were not 
destroyed by the fire had taken it upon themselves to house family and 
friends that were left homeless.  Between these acts of compassion and the 
provisions supplied by the Royal Government, there was not one person 
left without shelter in the aftermath of the blaze (Castellanos, 242). 
 The next action taken by the Governor was to dispatch three ships to 
Philadelphia.  The Governor withdrew 24,000 pesos from the Royal 
Treasury in New Orleans in order to purchase supplies that would be 
needed for the rebuilding of the City.  Provisions, nails, medicines and 
other “articles of first necessity” were to be purchased and brought back to 
New Orleans as quickly as possible.  Also ordered from Philadelphia were 
3,000 barrels of flour, to ensure that famine would not follow the fire 
(Castellanos, 242). 
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Governmental Response  
In the days following the disastrous fire of 1788, the residents  began 
to rebuild their once-thriving community.  The Cablido, which was 
essentially the city council of the Colony, gathered for the first time after 
the disaster on March 26, 1788, at the home of Governor Miro.  During this 
meeting, two urgent matters were considered by the council.  First, the 
Cabildo approved the continuation of providing rations to those left 
homeless and hungry by the disaster.  The items to be provided to families 
were expanded to include the necessary materials for building a small 
“cottage of pickets” in order to get people out of tents and back into some-
sort of home.   The third aspect of this same piece of legislation was the 
appointment of two members of the Cabildo to canvas the city to assess the 
needs of the citizens that remained encamped around the city.  The Cabildo 
members selected for this task were Don Francisco Pascalis de la Barre and 
Don Juan Arnoul (Cabildo, 13 - 14). 
 The second item of business addressed in this extraordinary session 
of the Cabildo was the public jail.  The jail was burned extensively in the 
fire, and being that a jail is vital to the public safety, the Cabildo elected to 
place the Chief-Constable in charge of the repairs to the facility, and 
allowed him to make use of the City Funds, just over 7,000 pesos, to 
resolve this dilemma.  The Cabildo elected two of its own members to 
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inspect the repairs made to the facility; Don Carlos de Reggio and Don 
Rodolfo Joseph Ducros were selected for this purpose (Cabildo, 14). 
 The following day, March 27, 1788, the Cabildo again convened to 
forward the resolutions of the previous day to the Intendant General of the 
Province without waiting for a list of those in need to be attached.  It was 
felt that this would enable the government to act more quickly in aiding the 
residents that were left homeless by the fire (Cabildo, 15). 
 The response by the Intendant General, dated March 27, 1788 and 
ordered to be entered into the Cabildo Archives agreed with the Cabildo’s 
request to provide rations to the residents of the community for as long as 
necessary, but declined to provide for the construction of barracks or 
cottages to meet the housing needs of the residents.  He entrusted the 
Assistant Attorney General of the colony to investigate the best way for the 
King to aid in the recovery and rebuilding of the community (Cabildo, 17). 
 Assistant Attorney General Juan Bienvenu submitted his report to 
the Cabildo on April 3, 1788; it was approved and entered into the record of 
the Cabildo at their regular meeting on April 4.  Three separate issues were 
raised in the letter of Assistant Attorney General Bienvenu: 1) 
reestablishment of commerce; 2) rebuilding loans; 3) scarcity of money. 
 The Assistant Attorney General, realized that the City’s merchants 
losses would compound the losses to the City by limiting the amount of 
goods available for sale, and in some cases making necessary items 
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impossible to purchase; to reconcile this situation he proposed opening up 
trade in the Gulf of Mexico to ships of other nations in order to ensure that 
the supply of goods required to rebuild the community would be available.  
The current practice of the Spanish Empire was to prohibit ships sailing 
under any flag but that of Spain from entering the waters of the Gulf.  The 
merchants of New Orleans requested that they alone be allowed by the 
Spanish government to enter into any port to import goods into the colony; 
however, the farmers, and other non-merchants saw this as a way for the 
merchant class of the city to control all commerce within the Colony.  
Rather than allowing merchants to travel to any port and purchase goods 
for resale in New Orleans, the Assistant Attorney General proposed to open 
the waters of the Gulf of Mexico to the ships of other nations for a period of 
ten (10) years.  Under this proposal, these foreign vessels would have to 
raise the Spanish flag and pay the six percent (6%) Custom House Duty 
imposed in New Orleans (Cabildo, 18-19). 
With the Intendant General of the Province not willing to provide for 
the construction of cottages or barracks for the homeless of New Orleans, it 
was proposed that the Crown provide rebuilding loans to those families left 
destitute.  The loan would be issued in proportion to what would be 
required to rebuild their homes and provide for clothing and other 
necessities.  The loans would be backed by using the homes to be 
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constructed as a guarantee against default, and would be repaid within ten 
(10) years (Cabildo, 19). 
The scarcity of money was not caused by the fire specifically, but was 
certainly magnified by it.  Due to Spain’s wartime monetary needs, regular 
currency had been replaced by credit certificates.  These certificates and 
the bank notes that followed them caused prices for goods in the City to 
increase due to the exchange costs of doing business with these documents.  
It was requested that His Majesty remove from commerce the credit 
certificates and bank notes, and replace them with numerary currency to 
reenergize the local economy (Cabildo, 20). 
At the Cabildo meeting of July 4, 1788, discussion turned to the 
construction of a new Cabildo building, as the previous one was destroyed 
in the fire.  It was decided that the City would seek royal permission to 
place their new government building on the public square at the center of 
town, with a Public Market on the first floor, and the government 
chambers above.  The Cabildo elected the Royal Ensign, Don Carlos de 
Reggio and the Chief Constable, Don Francisco Pascalis de la Barre to draft 
plans which would reflect the request, for His Majesty’s consideration 
(Cabildo, 31). 
Once the government building (The Cabildo) was constructed at the 
public square, Governor Miro proceeded to address the issue of the 
damaged public jail.  He ordered that a “calaboza” be constructed behind 
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the Cabildo.  Grace King describes the calaboza as “a grim two-story 
construction surrounded by walls of massive thickness, and filled with little 
cells and dungeons…” (King, 135).  Near this prison the military arsenal of 
the city was rebuilt (King, 135). 
The next significant building to appear was a hotel for the Governor 
of the province, this was placed at the corner of Toulouse Street and the 
levee.  In the place of the small wooden cottages that had once served as 
the homes of the City’s residents, grand Spanish style soon emerged.  Brick 
and stucco replaced wood, and iron-work, balconies and galleries became 
commonplace.  This became the style of the day; however, some structures 
were rebuilt more in the form of their pre-fire ancestors (King, 136). 
 
Fire Protection 
When the Cabildo convened on April 18, 1788, the issue of fire 
protection was at the top of the agenda.  The council unanimously agreed 
to ask Governor Miro to write a letter to the Captain General of the 
Province, Senor Don Joseph de Espleta, to request the delivery of four 
pumps to be used in fighting another fire.  It was agreed that these pumps 
would be the best defense for the city in the case of another conflagration 
such as the one that had occurred three weeks prior.  In the same session, it 
was decided that the City should have sixty leather buckets made, for the 
purpose of extinguishing a fire (Cabildo, 21).  Also ordered for the purpose 
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of protecting the community from another disastrous fire were “two hooks 
with a chain attached to each about fifteen feet long and its corresponding 
rope, and six hooks with long wooden handles” (Cabildo, 21).   
When the Cabildo convened on May 9, 1788, one of their first acts 
that day was to purchase a new bell to be placed in the Government House, 
to alert the citizens of emergencies or other important events.  The fire, 
which took place on March 21, 1788, is also known as the Good Friday fire; 
in keeping with Catholic tradition, church bells must remain silent on that 
day.  It so happened that the bell in the Government building was out of 
commission, which left no bells that could be sounded to alert the residents 
of the City to the fire (King, 130).  It is for this reason that the Cabildo 
found it necessary to expedite the purchase and installation of a new bell 
(Baron, 287). 
Governor Miro was replaced by Governor Carondelet in 1791; the 
first time fire prevention is explicitly mentioned in the records of the 
Cabildo is 1792.  At this time, the Spanish Colonial Government provided 
for not only fire buckets to be made available, but also provided fire 
engines and divided the city into four “wards.”  Once the city was divided, 
there was a police commissioner that was made responsible for taking 
command of the fire engines and organizing fire protection (O’Connor, 36 
– 7). 
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Private Initiative 
 The most significant aid in rebuilding came from the benevolence of 
Don Andres Almonaster y Rojas.  Almost immediately after the fire 
devastated the City of New Orleans, Almonaster came forward with an 
offer to rebuild the City’s school house.  This school was the first public 
school in New Orleans, originally established in 1772 to teach Spanish.  
After the successful completion of the school house, Almonaster decided to 
undertake many other civic rebuilding projects to expedite the recovery of 
the community.  
 The second project Almonaster offered to fund was the 
reconstruction of the parish church.  This project was completed at a cost 
of $50,000.  Almonaster went on to replace the old charity hospital with a 
$114,000 structure that was named “Charity Hospital of St. Charles” in 
honor of His Majesty, the King of Spain.  His civil works projects went on 
to include the construction of a “convent for the Capuchins” (The 
Presbytere) and a town hall (The Cabildo).  He also added a chapel to the 
Ursuline convent (King, 132 – 3). 
 Following the devastation of 1788, the residents of New Orleans 
began to look for an area to start expanding their City.  It was at this time 
that Bernard Gravier gained control of a portion of land that bordered on 
the Colonial City.  This area, originally named Ville Gravier was located just 
upstream from the original city, and after the fire of 1788 this land was 
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divided into lots and sold.  He was aided in these efforts by Don Carlos 
Laveau Trudeau, a Spanish Royal surveyor.  This new suburb, or Faubourg, 
became the first area into which the traditional city of New Orleans would 
expand (McCaffety, 2002).  After the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, 
Americans began to populate this area of the City.  This led the Faubourg 
Ste. Marie, as Ville Gravier was renamed in honor of his wife’s Patron 
Saint, to be known more commonly as the “American Sector” (Garvey, 80).  
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Chapter III 
 
The Fire of 1794 
 New Orleans was once again ravaged by flames in 1794.  Despite the 
preparation and efforts of the city government, this was another 
uncontrollable blaze that left a large segment of the City totally destroyed.  
On December 8, 1794 children were playing near a hay store on Royal 
Street and accidentally caused a fire to start in that facility.  The fire raged 
for approximately three hours, and by the time it was extinguished, 212 
structures had been burned (Garvey, 50).  This fire was not nearly as 
extensive as the Fire of 1788, but nonetheless several thousand people were 
left homeless (Castellanos, 311). 
 One may ask why, after the Fire of 1788 the City was not better 
prepared to fight another conflagration; the answer to that lies in training.  
The new fire-fighting equipment and pumps purchased after the Fire of 
1788 were in fact, utilized during this catastrophe, but due to insufficient 
training with the equipment, the efforts of the firefighters were futile. The 
fire-fighting pumps of that era were difficult to operate, and having not had 
the ability to gain experience with large fires, the firemen were learning as 
they worked.  The firemen and the commissioners in charge made a valiant 
effort to control the fire, but circumstance worked against them, and again 
the City was left with a large tract of ashes (O’Connor, 37). 
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 The map in Figure 4.1, drawn by Georgia B. Drennau in 1941, as part 
of the Historic American Building Survey in Louisiana, shows the outline of 
the fire that consumed much of the City.  The details of this map were 
drawn from the letter of Governor Carondelet to the King of Spain.  The 
wind was blowing from the north to northeast, and contributed greatly to 
the rapid spreading of the fire.  This was similar to Governor Miro’s 
account of the Fire of 1788, described in Chapter 2.  
Figure 4.1: Sketch showing area covered by the Great Fire, December 8, 1794. 
 
            Source: The Historic New Orleans Collection 
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Response to the Fire of 1794 
 It was after the devastation that occurred in 1794 that the residents 
of the city truly embraced the architectural changes that had been 
encouraged after the fire of 1788.  Homes would now be constructed of 
brick with common firewalls between them.  This produced the French 
Quarter look that still exists today, and is known around the world (Reeves, 
2006). 
 
Governmental Response 
 Just as in 1788, one of the first issues regarding the fire that the 
Cabildo officially addressed was the need to repair the Royal Jail.  This was 
first addressed during the meeting of the Cabildo on December 12, 1794.  
The jail was not destroyed during the fire; therefore, only repairs were 
needed to bring the facility back to a useful state (Cabildo, 177). 
 Two requests were made of the Cabildo at this time, by Juan Bautista 
Labatut the Attorney General: 1) to tear down the straw huts that had been 
built as emergency shelter after the fire of 1788 and 2) to have engineers 
inspect those houses near the plaza that were built of combustible material 
in order to prevent another large-scale fire from sweeping through the City 
(Cablido, 178). 
 The straw huts to which the Attorney General was referring were 
constructed as emergency housing for those left homeless by the Fire of 
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1788.  These structures were built on the property of the Capuchin Fathers, 
and were allowed to serve as temporary housing for up to two years 
following the first fire.  These huts were eventually sold to other persons, 
and by 1794, none of those originally granted the special permits by the 
Cabildo were residing in the small huts (Cabildo, 177 – 8). 
These small huts, originally meant to serve as temporary housing, 
were still present six years later, and were a cause of concern because 
within a week of the Fire of 1794 one of these huts burned, and was in very 
close proximity to the other huts of the same variety.  It was feared that one 
of these structures would be the cause of yet a third great fire.  The Cabildo 
agreed with the Attorney General, and ordered that these huts be 
destroyed, after first giving the current tenants one month to find 
alternative housing (Cabildo, 178). 
The Attorney General’s second request was also granted.  It was 
ordered that the small houses built along the sides of the public plaza be 
inspected for safety.  These houses belonged to Don Andres Almonaster y 
Rojas, a member of the Cabildo and prominent resident of the City.  The 
concern was raised regarding this property because the houses were built 
of a combustible material and were located very close to one another.  The 
Cabildo agreed with the Attorney General’s assessment of the situation and 
ordered that the houses be inspected and, if necessary, rebuilt in 
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accordance with the recommendations made by the engineers (Cabildo, 
178 – 9). 
In a letter dated December 19, 1794 Attorney General Labatut 
addresses the concerns of the residents of New Orleans to the Cabildo, and 
asks, in turn, that these concerns and requests be forwarded to the King of 
Spain.  The requests made in this letter reflect those requests made of His 
Majesty following the Fire of 1788.  This letter requested the King provide 
one million pesos in rebuilding loans, and that import duties be reduced to 
six percent (Cabildo, 181 – 2). 
The one million peso loan would be provided to citizens in order to 
reconstruct their homes, and would be divided proportionally so that those 
previously occupying larger homes would be able to rebuild their larger-
than-average homes.  By accepting the government loans to rebuild, the 
residents would have to agree that their new homes would meet certain 
criteria.  The home, regardless of size, must be built of brick, and must be 
topped with either a flat roof or a tile roof; these criteria were set in place in 
attempt to reduce the risk of another fire sweeping through large sections 
of the City (Cabildo, 181). 
Just as was offered after the Fire of 1788, the loans provided by the 
Crown for rebuilding would be guaranteed by the house built with the 
money; however, this time, there was the additional guarantee of all of a 
borrower’s assets, up to the amount of the loan.  The mortgage would be 
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offered on a ten-year term, but payment would not be required for the first 
two years (Cabildo, 181). 
The second request made in the Attorney General’s letter to the 
Cabildo was that His Majesty allow the import duties collected in New 
Orleans to be lowered to six percent.  This was seen as a way to aid the 
City’s recovery, while at the same time providing an incentive to commerce 
that was sorely needed after the disaster.  Many stores, shops and other 
retail establishments were destroyed in the Fire of December 8, 1794, and 
by allowing the lowering of import duties, the shopkeepers and merchants 
would be more able to restock their businesses and provide the goods that 
the residents of the City desperately needed and desired (Cabildo, 180 – 2). 
The letter from the Attorney General of the Province was presented 
to the Cabildo during their December 19, 1794 meeting.  Upon reviewing 
the document, the council voted unanimously to approve the document.  
Approval by the Cabildo allowed the Colonial Governor of New Orleans to 
forward the letter to the King of Spain in a direct appeal for aid (Cabildo, 
182). 
 
Fire Protection 
 In 1795, the Cabildo levied a Chimney Tax to pay for fire-fighting 
equipment and the personnel to operate it.  This tax provided 
approximately 4,000 pesos a year in revenue to be used for protecting the 
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City from future fires.  This tax not only paid for fire protection, but also 
fire prevention.  This tax provided for master bricklayers to inspect 
chimneys around the city, these men were paid two pesos a day for their 
service to the City.  A portion of this fund also provided gas lamps to be 
placed around the City for added safety at night (Din, 96). 
 Around this same time, a type of fire insurance came into being.  
Several volunteer fire brigades formed throughout the City and through 
donations to their cause, building owners were given a particular mark to 
display on their building.  The display of this mark would provide 
preferential fire protection to those persons able to afford the donation.  
Preferential treatment was given during general fires only, if there were 
one building burning, the brigade would report regardless of whether the 
property displayed the mark.  Unfortunately for those unable or unwilling 
to make the required donation, most fires at that time were general fires, 
and therefore the building displaying the mark would receive concentrated 
fire-fighting efforts (Garvey, 56). 
 In 1804, the Council was presented with a report from a Fire 
Committee with recommendations for improving fire protection 
throughout the City.  It was recommended that a foreman and a fire 
company of fifteen men be attached to each of the four engines that were 
placed in the City’s four wards.  This report was presented to the Council 
on April 7, 1804; by April 11, the appointed foremen of these fire 
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companies presented the Council with lists of proposed company 
members.  The lists were accepted by the Council, and on that same day a 
committee was formed for the sole purpose of honoring the requisitions of 
the newly formed fire companies (O’Connor, 38). 
 Perhaps the most significant policy shift that came about after the 
Fire of 1794 was that the Cabildo passed an ordinance requiring all 
buildings over one story in height to be constructed of brick.  This 
requirement greatly influenced not only what materials were used in the 
rebuilding of the City, but also the architectural style in which it was done.  
Prior to the Fire of 1794, much of the architecture reflected the French 
culture that predominated in the City.  In the rebuilt City, “the wide and 
shallow hipped roof, galleried townhouse perfected in the French period 
gave way vertical, long and narrow Spanish-style townhomes, many with 
overhangs, iron work and mezzanines” (Reeves, 2006).  This brought to 
New Orleans a look and feel that was distinctly more Spanish than French.  
The effect that these new standards had on the City was to reflect the 
Spanish holdings in the Caribbean, upon which much of the new 
architecture was based (Garvey, 50).  
 
Private Initiative 
 Just as the fire of 1788 spurred the development of Faubourg Ste. 
Marie, the 1794 fire amplified the growth of the City.  It was a combination 
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of factors, fires of the Vieux Carré and increasing population, which caused 
several new suburbs to arise around the historical core of New Orleans.   
 One of the first of these new suburbs was the Faubourg Marigny.  
The area is named for Bernard Xavier Phillippe de Marigny de Mandeville 
who, along with his guardian Solomon Prevost had the Marigny plantation, 
located just downriver from the Vieux Carré divided into parcels and sold.  
Marigny was considered a minor when he inherited his family’s fortune in 
1803; therefore, any action taken regarding the property had to be 
approved by his appointed guardian (Reynolds, 2005). 
 In order to be allowed to offer the parcels of his plantation for sale, 
he first had to seek the approval of the City Council.  Once this approval 
was granted, the first lot in the newly created Faubourg Marigny was sold 
in September 1805.  By the end of the year, thirty more parcels had been 
sold, and by 1811 over 150 households called this area home.  The parcels 
measured thirty feet by one hundred feet, on average; making it possible to 
construct not only single family homes on these properties, but also 
doubles (Reynolds, 2005) 
 Another area that began to rapidly develop in the late 1790’s to early 
1800’s was the Faubourg Tremé.  In 1794 the Carondelet Canal, which ran 
through the plantation of Claude Tremé, was completed.  This made the 
land owned by Mr. Tremé very valuable as an industrial corridor.  Some 
residential development took place at this point, but it was not until the 
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Girod Canal was completed in 1822 that Tremé was able to be completely 
drained of water and allowed to develop.  Once the land was cleared and 
made ready for residential development, the City laid out the street pattern 
in 1826.  Within ten years of the street pattern being fixed, the Tremé 
neighborhood was almost completely developed (City Planning 
Commission, 1999). 
 At this time, the boundaries of New Orleans were also pushing 
further upriver into what would be known as the Garden District and 
Uptown.  The development beyond Faubourg Ste. Marie officially began in 
1806 when Madame Marguerite Delord-Sarpy decided to have surveyor 
Barthelemy Lafon subdivide her plantation into parcels to be sold.  Before 
Lafon’s work was done, Madame Delord-Sarpy sold her property to 
Armand Duplantier.  Mr. Duplantier, with the help of Lafon created the 
Faubourg Annonciation.  This is the area that is commonly known now as 
the Lower Garden District (Starr, 16). 
 
Fire Prevention 
 Having learned the valuable lessons of the fires of 1788 and 1794, the 
City Council of New Orleans passed an ordinance on January 31, 1807 that 
laid out all city regulations regarding fire prevention.  This ordinance was 
commonly known as the “Bucket Ordinance” because one of the key 
regulations was that every home and business was to have at least two 
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buckets to be used for fighting fires.  The ordinance was comprised of three 
titles: Title I: Precautions against Fires; Title II: Firemen and Sapeurs; Title 
III: Aid in Case of Fire (O’Connor, 39 – 43). 
 Title I of the ordinance required that a number of conditions be met 
by the residents of New Orleans.  The provision of buckets was chief among 
them; all homes and businesses were required to have two fire buckets on 
their premises at all times, and also required that those buckets be 
suspended in “a conspicuous place.”  Landlords were to provide tenants 
with their buckets, and when vacating a property, if the buckets were not 
returned to the landlord in good condition, the tenant would have to 
replace them.  This ordinance also provided that if buckets were not 
obtained by a homeowner within six months, the City would provide 
buckets to the homeowner at cost.  One other aspect of Title I applied to all 
residents of New Orleans and the Faubourgs.  There was to be a well dug 
on every property in the city.  The minimum dimensions of the wells were 
to be at least ten feet deep and four feet in diameter (O’Connor, 40). 
 The ordinance went on to detail where the City’s fire engines were to 
be housed and what other fire fighting equipment would be kept with 
them.  Four engines were to be housed at City Hall along with various and 
sundry other equipment.  A large sign was to be placed on the peristyle of 
City Hall that read “Dépôt des Pompes” in both English and French.  The 
rest of the City’s fire engines were to be placed at various locations around 
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the City.  One would be placed in each quarter of the city, one in the 
Faubourg Ste. Marie, and one in the play-house.  Again, these locations 
would also be used to store fire-fighting equipment, such as ladders and 
hooks that would be useful in saving the City from another disaster. Each 
of these locations was to be labeled with a sign similar to the one at City 
Hall, so that all residents would know where to find the appropriate 
equipment in the case of a fire (O’Connor, 42 – 3). 
 Title II effectively created the first Fire Department in New Orleans.  
The City Council ordered that companies of firemen be attached to each of 
the pumps in the city.  A foreman and an assistant foreman would be 
provided for each company; each large pump would receive an additional 
eighteen firemen and the smaller pumps would each receive ten.  All 
companies were to be administered by a Captain and two Lieutenants, 
these men would remain in touch with City Hall and would provide the 
City’s instructions to the foreman of each company.  Title II also provided 
for the services of “sapeurs.”  By the duties listed in the ordinance, these 
sapuers would be workmen “accustomed to use the axe, such as carpenters, 
joiners, wheelwrights, blacksmiths and ironworkers” (O’Connor, 43).  
These men would be appointed by the mayor, and would serve when 
needed by the fire companies (O’Connor, 43). 
 Title III details the actions that are to be expected of the City officials 
and the residents in case a fire were to occur.  Residents were expected to 
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shout “Fire!” and report to City Hall to report the incident.  By reporting to 
City Hall, the guard on duty would ring the bell to summon fire fighters 
and city officials to City Hall or another designated location, such as an 
engine house.  To be sure that someone of authority is present in the case 
of a fire, the mayor appointed a “Commissaire annuel” for each district in 
the City and each of the faubourgs.  This man would possess the authority 
of the Mayor, if the mayor were to be absent in an emergency.  If the Mayor 
were present, the Commissaire would assist him in matters directly 
affecting that district.  It was also provided in Title III that to encourage the 
expeditious service of the fire companies, the City would award fifty dollars 
to the first company to arrive with its engine at the scene of a fire 
(O’Connor, 43 – 4).   
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Chapter IV 
 
The Significance of Disaster 
 
New Orleans on the Rebound 
 The resilience of New Orleans, as a place and as an idea is amazing.  
Vale and Campanella’s (2005) recent book entitled “The Resilient City” 
chronicles the destruction and reconstruction of a number or World Cities.  
It is noted that between the years of 1100 and 1800 only forty-two cities 
were abandoned entirely because of disaster (Ibid, 3).  The vast majority of 
cities is rebuilt and generally emerges from disaster in a better situation 
than before.  American cities have shown amazing resilience in the past 
230 years, San Francisco, Chicago and Washington were all severely 
burned; Galveston was nearly obliterated by a hurricane and numerous 
communities across the nation have been ravaged by their own unique 
series of events.  What makes New Orleans stand out in this crowd?  This is 
of great interest today and the question has been asked:  is there only so 
much resilience that one city can muster (Vale, 3)? 
 Within the relatively short lifespan of the City of New Orleans, the 
city has endured numerous disasters that have left the City in the unique 
and undesirable position of debating the merits of reconstruction.  Two of 
the most significant were, arguably, the fires of the late eighteenth century.  
Perhaps it is because these events were not truly natural disasters, but man 
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made.  There is no evidence showing a debate over the rebuilding of New 
Orleans after the large scale destruction seen in 1788 and 1794.  The 
residents picked up the pieces of their city and their lives and strived to 
make New Orleans a better place than it had been before.   
 At this point in the development of New Orleans, the involvement of 
the national government was more direct than cities experience in the 
present system of government.  The person charged with the day-to-day 
administration of the colony was the Royal Governor, appointed by the 
King of Spain; this allowed for direct appeals to His Majesty in cases such 
as fires that destroyed large portions of the city as was demonstrated by 
Governor Miro in his post-fire letter to the King of Spain in 1788 
(Castellanos, 238 – 44).  The direct involvement of the Royal Government 
in the affairs of the colony significantly aided the recovery of the City after 
both fires.  At the request of the Royal Governors of New Orleans, the 
Royal Treasury made available loans to the colonists to help them rebuild 
their lives.  These loans, as was previously discussed, were very low interest 
and allowed colonists to place the home they promised to build as 
collateral (Cabildo, 19). 
Also at issue at this time was the value of the Mississippi River to 
trade, not only for the Spanish, but for French and American hunters and 
traders.  Prior to the fire of 1788, the Spanish decreed that any non-
Spanish ship would have to obtain a permit from a Spanish official before 
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entering the Mississippi River.  Beyond that restriction, a complete 
inventory of cargo and prices (for resale) would have to be provided to the 
government.  If the prices were deemed to be too high, the ship would not 
be allowed to unload at New Orleans.  The final restriction stated that 
when the ship left the City, at least one third of out-going cargo had to be 
products of the colony (Eakin, 138).  After the fires, trade became less 
restricted, but remained under the control of the Spanish authorities.  Any 
ship would now be allowed to enter into the Mississippi, provided that it 
raise the flag of Spain and pay a six percent duty at port (Cabildo, 18-19).   
The less restrictive trade policies put in place in the aftermath of the 
fires aided the recovery of the city in two distinct ways: the rebuilding of 
the economy and the rebuilding of lives.  The economy would be bolstered 
by this plan for two reasons.  First, by allowing the ships of any nation to 
sail to the Port of New Orleans, local merchants would have the ability to 
restock the warehouses that had been reduced to ashes.  This would, 
therefore, allow merchants to reopen for business and provide the much 
needed materials required for rebuilding an entire city (Cabildo, 18-19).   
The second economic incentive that drove this plan forward was the 
imposition of the six percent Custom House Duty to be paid by all ships 
utilizing the port, this duty would allow for the Royal Treasury to recoup 
the losses it suffered in the conflagration.  An additional benefit of allowing 
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ships to utilize the port was that this action was seen as a way to prevent 
smuggling goods into the City from the Gulf of Mexico (Cabildo, 18-19).   
The second reason for the implementation of this less restrictive 
policy was to help the colonists rebuild their lives after the enormous 
catastrophe.  By opening the port to ships of other nations, colonists were 
able to purchase clothing and rebuild their homes more expeditiously than 
if only Spanish ships had to provide all materials.  The Cabildo noted that 
those suffering the greatest loss were the merchants, but at the same time 
“a great many of [New Orleans’] inhabitants have been reduced to the most 
miserable conditions” (Cabildo, 19).    
The late nineteenth century proved not to be the worst time for such 
a disaster to occur.  It was just at this time that New Orleans started to 
experience rapid growth; not only insofar as new colonists from Europe, 
but also with people migrating from the newly established United States 
and other European colonies in the “New World.”  In 1788, the same year 
as the first fire, the colonial government had conducted a survey, and it was 
determined that the population of New Orleans was just over five-thousand 
persons.  The entire colonial province boasted a population of 42,611 
(Saxon, 150).   
  Within twenty years of the first fire, New Orleans was completely 
reshaped, not just in its built form, but also in the way in which it 
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functioned.  Lyle Saxon described the effects of the fires eloquently in his 
book Fabulous New Orleans:  
The city that fell before the flames was a congested French 
community of wooden houses, badly arranged and irregular.  
A stately Spanish city rose in its stead. … The City which rose 
from its ashes was of brick and plaster, with arches of heavy 
masonry and roofs of tile.  There were barred windows and 
long, dark corridors.  Large fan-shaped windows looked down 
into courtyards which held banana trees, oleanders, and 
parterres of flowers.  Houses were built flush with the 
sidewalks; and balconies railed with delicate wrought iron, 
overhung the streets (Saxon, 150). 
 
 The first settlement beyond the boundaries of the original city took 
place in the aftermath of the Fire of 1788.  Perhaps it was a fear of another 
disaster, or perhaps it was simply a timely coincidence; but, what is known 
is that immediately after the Fire of 1788, the shape of New Orleans was 
forever changed.  Once the Faubourg Ste. Marie was approved the 
expedient growth of New Orleans began.  Within a quarter century of the 
first fire, New Orleans was the largest American City west of the 
Appalachian Mountains, and was still growing.  The population of New 
Orleans in 1803 was estimated to be between 8,000 and 12,000 persons, 
no more accurate estimates are available (Campbell 1921, 415).  Regardless 
of what the population was in 1803, there was a significant increase in 
population in the first years of American Territorial government.  In the 
1810 United States Census, the first census conducted after the Louisiana 
Purchase, New Orleans had a population of nearly 17,000 people (US 
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Census Bureau, 2).  To demonstrate the relative size of New Orleans to 
other western American Cities, in 1810 the City of St. Louis had a 
population of approximately 1,400 people (US Census Bureau, 2).    
 The growth of New Orleans in the late nineteenth century is, of 
course, not attributable to the fires that ravaged the city.  Rather, the City, 
like many others across North America and the fledgling United States, was 
experiencing rapid growth.  It seems that the fires served as a starting point 
in the physical growth and redevelopment of the area.  As was articulated 
in the quote by Lyle Saxon, New Orleans became a ‘modern’ city in the 
wake of the fires.  Since large tracts of land were cleared and required 
rebuilding, this was the chance to ensure that development followed some 
sort of standardized guidelines (Garvey 50 - 51).   
The rapid resurrection of New Orleans from its ashes is due 
primarily to the region’s rapid growth at that point in history.  Americans 
were beginning their westward expansion, and the Mississippi River would 
play a key role in that expansion.  By 1800, well over 250,000 immigrants, 
farmers and explorers had left the confines of the new United States and 
ventured into the Ohio and Kentucky Territories, and into Spanish 
Louisiana.  These adventurous pioneers relied heavily on the Mississippi 
River for trade with both European colonies and the east coast cities of the 
United States.  It was a combination of this exploratory spirit and the 
necessities of trade that brought thousands of new residents to 
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southeastern Louisiana and New Orleans at the close of the eighteenth 
century (Muzzy, 139 – 41).   
 
The Significance for Posterity 
 A historical look at the City of New Orleans cannot be attempted 
without a brief look at how the place came to be.  In 1718 brothers Pierre Le 
Moyne, Sieur de Iberville and Jean Baptiste Le Moyne, Sieur de Bienville 
established the Colony of New Orleans at the present location of the Vieux 
Carré.  This was a location that was selected more for its strategic position 
than its environment.  The bend in the river gave the colony an advantage 
in identifying vessels approaching the area from either direction (Garvey, 
17-20).  The colony remained French until it was ceded to Spain under the 
Peace of Paris, signed in 1763, marking the ending of the Seven Years’ War 
(Wall, 53).   
 It turned out that the great fires that ravaged the City gave the 
Spanish their only opportunity to levy any influence on the development of 
the city.  The Spanish officially took control of the Colony in late 1765.  His 
Majesty appointed Antonio de Ulloa to serve as the governor of the 
Louisiana territory.  The Spanish regime only took control as far as titles 
are concerned.  The residents of New Orleans remained French throughout 
the Spanish period (Wall, 55).  Edwin Adams Davis remarked in his 
History of Louisiana that “seldom in history has a dominant power been so 
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lenient with colonials of another nationality, and seldom has a ruling 
nationality  been so completely dominated and assimilated by that held 
under control” (Garvey, 41).   
 In the aftermath of the fires, the Cabildo enacted ordinances 
regulating the building standards that created the relatively standard 
outward appearance that is recognized as the “New Orleans French 
Quarter” around the world.  French Colonial architecture was wood-based, 
and had already proved to be insufficient for ensuring public safety in the 
community; this led to the importation of the Caribbean-Spanish style of 
architecture that is the most readily apparent mark left by the Spanish on 
Louisiana (Garvey, 42). 
 It was also at this time that the culture of the New Orleans area was 
shifting from the traditional French that had persisted throughout the 
Spanish period.  .  Interestingly, while under Spanish rule little Spanish 
culture was injected into the New Orleans way-of-life.  It was the massive 
influx of Americans at this time and others migrating into the colony that 
had the social; and cultural influences that we recognize today.    
 Although the Spanish controlled the City of New Orleans from 1765 
until 1803, there is little Spanish culture that is present in the region.  This 
is primarily attributed to a difference in colonial practices between the 
French and Spanish.  When the French began to colonize New Orleans as a 
city rather than a military outpost, the men would bring their wives and 
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children to the colony, thus preserving their heritage.  The Spanish, 
however, only sent men into the colony for many years.  These single men 
would then marry into the Creole and French families and adopt the 
culture and language more familiar to their new families (Garvey, 41). 
 The Americans, having adopted the concept of Manifest Destiny, 
began flowing into the City during the 1790’s.  The rate at which these 
“foreigners” entered into the City is unknown; however, in 1801 Don Juan 
Manuel de Salcedo, the last Spanish governor of Louisiana issued a decree 
prohibiting Americans from receiving any land grants in the Colony.  This 
was seen as a way to dissuade the “designs of the Americans.” Salcedo also 
suspended the right of deposit for American shipping, and refused to 
designate another site where cargo could be placed (King, 153).  These 
actions were resented by the United States; it was felt that the Americans 
had the right, by the law of nature, to utilize the Mississippi (King, 153 – 4).  
Grace King’s New Orleans: The Place and The People contains an 
unattributed quote that reflects the sentiments of the American nation:  
The Mississippi is ours, by the law of nature.  Our rivers swell 
its volume and flow with it to the Gulf of Mexico.  Its mouth is 
the only issue which nature has given to our waters, and we 
wish to use it for our vessels.  No power in the world should 
deprive us of our rights.  If our liberty in this matter is 
disputed, nothing shall prevent our taking possession of the 
capital, and when we are once masters of it we shall know how 
to maintain ourselves there.  If Congress refuses us effectual 
protection, we will adopt measures which our safety requires, 
even if they endanger the peace of the Union and our 
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connection with the other States.  No protection, no allegiance 
(King, 154). 
 
The Americans in the Ohio Valley had begun to depend on the Mississippi 
as a trade route after the acceptance of Pickney’s Treaty in 1795.  It was this 
treaty that secured the Right of Deposit for American shipping in New 
Orleans.  The treaty only secured the right for three years, but the right was 
not rescinded until Governor Salcedo saw that the American influence in 
the city was becoming too strong in 1802 (Wall, 80). 
 Unbeknownst to the Spanish Colonial authorities and the citizens, 
New Orleans was ceded back to France on October 1, 1800 through the 
Treaty of San Ildefonso.  France would not formally take command of the 
City for another three years.  Following the Treaty, the United States 
decided that in order to guarantee trade through the mouth of the 
Mississippi, the City of New Orleans would have to be American.  In 1803, 
the United States purchased the entire Louisiana Territory from Napoleon, 
including the Isle of Orleans (Wall, 80-3). 
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Chapter V 
Comparison to Katrina 
 
 
The worst natural disaster in American History 
 
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall initially near 
Buras, Louisiana and proceeded across marshland and low-lying areas of 
Louisiana to make final landfall near the mouth of the Pearl River (NOAA, 
3).  Although it came ashore as a Category 3 storm on the Saffir-Simpson 
Hurricane Scale, Katrina is the costliest storm to ever strike the United 
States, and is one of the five deadliest storms on record.  Katrina is 
regarded as “one of the most devastating natural disasters in United States 
history” (NOAA, 1).  Widespread destruction was suffered from 
southeastern Louisiana to Florida’s panhandle; the most concentrated 
damage was in Louisiana and on Mississippi’s Gulf Coast.  (NOAA, 1) 
Hurricane Katrina caused chaos and destruction everywhere in New 
Orleans.  The storm surge caused levees to fail throughout the City of New 
Orleans, inundating the City with brackish waters, essentially making the 
City an extension of Lake Pontchartrain.  The failed levees caused extensive 
flooding throughout eighty percent of the city.  Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are 
satellite images of southeastern Louisiana; the top picture was taken on 
August 30, 2005 the lower picture on August 27, 2005.  The extent of the 
flooding in New Orleans can clearly be seen in Figure 5.1 (NASA).
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2: A pair of images from the NASA Terra Satellite.  Figure 5.1 shows the 
massive flooding in New Orleans, taken August 30, 2005.  Figure 5.2 shows how New 
Orleans appears normally, taken August 27, 2005. 
Figure 5.1  
 
Figure 5.2                     Source: The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
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Table 5.1
Fire Flood
80% of the built environment of New 
Orleans was destroyed.
80% of New Orleans' land area was 
innundated with brackish flood waters
The fires were spontaneous disasters 
that caused the residents to relocate for 
the duration of the event.
The flooding was a byproduct of  
hurricane, which was a predictable 
event causing large-scale evacuations in 
preparation for the event. 
The damage caused by the fires was 
limited to the time of the event itself.  
Allowing for rebuilding and relief 
efforts to come online immediately.
The destruction following Hurricane 
Katrina were caused by a series of 
events and weeks of standing water, 
preventing relief, recovery or rebuilding 
efforts from beginning.
The population of New Orleans was 
available to respond to the disaster and 
to begin recovery operations as soon as 
disaster conditions ceased.
The population of New Orleans was 
spread across the United States, thus 
placing the full burden of clean-up on 
the government and preventing citizens 
from participating in their own 
recovery.
Disaster Comparisons and Contrasts
Comparison
Contrasts
 
Parallels to Rebuilding in 1788 and 1794 
There are numerous parallels between the great fires of 1788 and 
1794 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the most obvious among them being 
that in 1788 eighty percent (80%) of the city was consumed by flames and 
in 2005 that same percentage of the city was consumed by water.   
Governments have always had a responsibility to their citizens for 
such things as defense in times of war and to ensure well being in times of 
crisis.  These obligations are made clear in governmental responses to 
completely different disasters that span almost 220 years.  Housing, 
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sustenance and ability to rebuild are the primary factors that a victim of 
disaster would likely be most concerned with.  Secondary, and less 
immediately pressing factors are how, where and what to rebuild.   
There seems to be a standard series of responses that a government 
sets into motion in the aftermath of disaster, the immediate needs of 
housing and food are the first to be addressed.  Soon thereafter, the 
government must begin the process of helping people put their lives back 
together.   
On the night of March 21, 1788, within hours of the city being 
decimated by a ferocious blaze, the military was busy distributing military 
field tents to ensure that every resident of New Orleans had a roof over 
their heads as night approached.  Many of the citizens of the colony were 
left with only the clothes on their backs, the royal governor understood his 
obligation as the King’s representative in the colony; he was to ensure the 
survival of the colonists and New Orleans itself (Castellanos, 241-2).  In the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) began the task of ensuring that those most affected by the disaster 
were taken care of.  This included shelter, ranging from large public 
shelters with hundreds of evacuees to individual hotel rooms for families 
with nowhere else to go.     
Unlike the immediate response offered by the Royal Government, 
FEMA was not on the ground in the immediate aftermath of the event.  
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This difference could be attributed to two distinct variations between the 
events: the type of government and type of disaster.  In 1788, the Royal 
Government of the colony was an absolute power while the United States 
has varying strata of governmental authority.  The Spanish Administration 
had the capability to utilize all resources under their control to ensure that 
immediate needs were met; the complex nature of modern government has 
caused government response time to slow dramatically.  There is no 
question that the sheer magnitude of Hurricane Katrina’s devestation 
overwhelmed the government’s response capabilities; however, in the years 
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, 
there has been a push to ready governments at all levels for a catastrophic 
event.  Four years of preparation and planning for disasters was tested, and 
the end result demonstrated in the extreme events of the Louisiana 
Superdome and Ernest Morial Convention Center in the days following 
Hurricane Katrina where thousands of New Orleanians were left destitute 
without such basic provisions as food and water.   
As the City of New Orleans filled with storm surge, thousands of 
American citizens were virtually abandoned by their government for days 
while issues such as who has control and who has responsibility was 
worked out.  Rather than allowing the agency with the necessary resources 
to evacuate the remaining residents of the City, the government bickered 
 44
amongst themselves about who should be doing the work, instead of who 
could. 
The other distinct difference affecting the governmental response to 
Katrina was the very nature of the disaster.  Fires and floods have distinctly 
different aftermaths; in the case of the Fires of 1788 and 1794, the disaster 
struck with no warning, and the only way to remain safe was to get out of 
the path of the spreading flames.  This meant that while the city would 
have been virtually empty during the event, the citizens and government of 
the City would have returned as soon as the flames were extinguished.  In 
2005, vast swaths of the City were filled with brackish floodwaters for as 
much as three weeks, inhibiting both the rescue effort and the importation 
of relief goods. 
As the City of New Orleans began to rebuild in the eighteenth 
century, the Royal government saw that the economy of the area was 
devastated.  This meant that there would not only be no economic activity, 
but also there would be no way for people to find the money to rebuild 
their lives.  In order to fund the reconstruction of the city, the Cabildo 
requested an interest-free loan from the His Majesty that would place the 
house that was to be rebuilt as collateral, since few in the colony had 
anything left upon which they could leverage a loan.  These loans would be 
provided in relation to how much money would be necessary to rebuild a 
home comparable to the one destroyed.  While there are no records 
 45
available that provide specific loan-qualifying details, the records of the 
Cabildo indicate that this loan was specifically for “those who absolutely 
lack the means and resources to do so” (Cabildo, 19).  Today, this monetary 
aid has been provided primarily by two federal agencies, the Small 
Business Administration (SBA) and FEMA, as well as the newly formed 
Road Home program created by the State of Louisiana to aid uninsured 
and underinsured homeowners rebuild their lives and their communities.   
In 1788 and 1794, the royal loans were provided to those most in 
need after the conflagrations that consumed large swaths of the City of 
New Orleans.  The problem faced in the wake of Hurricane Katrina is how 
to repeat that process.  Under a myriad of federal regulations that have 
been designed in a piecemeal fashion through the years, there are 
qualifying conditions that must be met in order to receive a disaster 
recovery loan through the SBA.  Many of the areas most heavily impacted 
by the hurricane were low-to-moderate income areas, where the residents 
likely did not have flood insurance, nor do they possess the resources to 
rebuild.  Those fortunate enough to possess insurance have been 
systematically receiving lower settlements that they are likely entitled to, 
but due either a lack of awareness of settlement options or a long standing 
distrust of government many African-Americans in the most heavily 
damaged areas have not challenged the assessments of their insurers 
(Callimachi, 2006).  Another item that these people do not possess is the 
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ability to meet the qualifying conditions set forth by the federal 
government.  This means that those actually benefiting from the SBA loan 
program are those needing such assistance the least.   
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is another 
agency tasked with helping to rebuild the lives of those affected by the 
hurricane.  The programs administered by FEMA are done so far more 
liberally than those of the SBA, while this allows for those most in need to 
get greater assistance, it also opens the door for fraud.  In the immediate 
wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA opened its coffers to the New Orleanians 
spread throughout the fifty-states.  Immediate disaster assistance grants 
were made to virtually any applicant haling from a federally declared postal 
code; there have also been housing allowances provided to allow for 
‘temporary housing’ in either apartments or hotels.  Under the Stafford Act 
which governs the operations of FEMA, permanent housing solutions are 
not allowed within the scope of FEMA’s mission.  It has been well 
established that fraud occurred on a mass scale following Hurricane 
Katrina.  It is estimated that tens, possibly hundreds of millions of dollars 
were misdirected through disaster fraud to those unaffected by the 
Hurricane (Kutz, 2006). 
Another present day parallel to the Spanish Administration’s loan 
program is the State of Louisiana’s Road Home program.  The goal of this 
program is to help everyone displaced because of Hurricane Katrina either 
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come home, or stay where they are – whichever they choose.  The funding 
for this program is from a Congressional Appropriation of seven and a half 
billion dollars that is earmarked for assisting homeowners recover from 
uninsured losses.  The Road Home so far is promising to be a rough one.  
The State originally estimated that 123,000 homeowners would qualify for 
funding and that grants would be up to $150,000.  In the first eight weeks 
of the program’s existence, they report that approximately 33,000 people 
have registered; of that “only 255 homeowners have been told how much 
money they qualify for, an average of $41,582 apiece” (Krupa, 2006 a).     
In response to the devastating conflagrations that consumed the 
City, the Cabildo ordered that all structures be built of brick, rather than 
the wood that was more common in the area.  This order shaped the Vieux 
Carré into what the “French Quarter” is known as today.  A number of 
responses to Hurricane Katrina have been implemented that will have a 
lasting effect on what the City will look like as we move into the future.  
During a Special Legislative Session of the Louisiana Legislature, the state 
formally adopted the International Construction Codes, 2006 as the 
official building code for the State of Louisiana.  This enhanced regulation 
was designed to bring buildings to a higher standard concerning 
vulnerability to wind damage, and durability.  This change will not likely 
have the same type of impact as a policy-based shift in building materials 
since these changes deal more with the function than the form of buildings.  
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However, other changes in the subsequent months will have a greater 
effect on the actual appearance of the City (LPJA, 2005).   
As to not risk the loss of potential FEMA funding or enrollment in 
the National Flood Insurance Program for the City and its residents, the 
Council of the City of New Orleans passed Ordinance Number 22354 
M.C.S. in August of 2006.  This ordinance amended the city’s Base Flood 
Elevation as determined by the National Flood Insurance Program.  The 
affected changes require that all homes in the City be a minimum of three 
feet higher than the height of the curb in front of the house, or at the level 
of the Advisory Base Flood Elevation, whichever is higher.  This will have 
an impact on both the recovery and the aesthetics of the community.  It 
should be noted that the ordinance does waive compliance for all districts 
and buildings under the jurisdiction of any of the City’s historic 
preservation agencies (City of New Orleans, 2006).   
The requirements of this ordinance and the new flood maps apply 
specifically to those structures with greater than fifty percent (50%) 
damage.  This would be considered ‘substantial damage’ which is defined 
as “repairs costing more than 50 percent of the cost to completely rebuild 
the home” (Thevenot, 2006).  Those buildings with less than 50% damage 
would not be required to adhere to the more stringent standards enacted in 
the wake of Katrina, rather they would be allowed to remain at the Base 
Flood Elevation in effect at the time of construction.  For those structures 
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build before the City enrolled in the National Flood Insurance Program in 
1975, as long as the damage to the property was less than the 50% 
threshold that has been set in place, the property would simply be 
grandfathered into the program.  Many questions remain about the future 
insurability of properties with less than 50% damage from the hurricane; it 
is possible that future purchasers of the property will be unable to get flood 
insurance unless they agree to bring the property up to modern elevations 
(Thevenot, 2006). 
New Orleanians have actively been seeking to reduce damage 
estimates to avoid the costly process of raising or razing their homes to 
comply with these new standards.  As residents approach the City to obtain 
the proper rebuilding documentation, they are also appealing the initial 
damage assessments of their properties.  By reducing damages to less than 
50% of replacement cost, the city is allowed to issue construction permits 
and let homeowners proceed with rebuilding their lives.  This is likely o be 
a smart move on the part of the city in terms of rebuilding and 
repopulating, but the effect of public safety and property protection may be 
detrimental in the long term.  The standards for granting appeals in many 
cases is as simple as bringing in photographs and stating that only 
‘moderate’ rather than ‘substantial’ work would be required.  The City of 
New Orleans and FEMA are at odds over the justifiability of this practice, 
FEMA contends that by allowing residents to rebuild, the City will expose 
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them to future flooding, while the City maintains that the flooding was 
caused “by catastrophic - - and preventable - - failure of the flood 
protection system, not because home elevations were too low” (Meitrodt, 
2006 a). 
The implementation of this ordinance will require creative solutions 
if the architecture of New Orleans is to be maintained in the rebuilding of 
the City.  What seems likely to occur is that New Orleans will either find 
itself with a city full of homes built over garages, or a drastic change in the 
way that homes are being built.  Older New Orleans architecture did 
integrate flood protection in the form of being raised several feet off of the 
ground to allow for the flooding that was common before the levee system 
was built to protect the region.  As levee protection came to be almost 
certain, homes were beginning to be built slab-on-grade; this made 
construction more timely and efficient, but does not allow for lifting to be 
brought in compliance with the City’s new flood maps.  While the 
picturesque New Orleans of postcard fame seems to be protected from this 
fate, many mid-twentieth century homes are being lost.  These are 
structures that were historic in their own rights, but the cost and level of 
difficulty may be too high for some homeowners to accept. 
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Table 5.2
Fire Flood
FEMA and the SBA have loan and grant 
programs designed to aid in the rebuilding of 
homes and businesses in the disaster areas.
Louisiana has created the Road Home program, 
funded by a $7.5 billion Congressional 
Appropriation to  help Louisiana homeowners 
rebuild or relocate.
In the 2005 Extraordinary Session of the 
Louisiana Legislature, the International 
Construction Codes, 2006  was adopted as the 
baseline building code for the State of Louisiana.
The New Orleans City Council approved the 
Advisory Base Flood Elevation maps as provided 
by the National Flood Insurance Program.  
These elevations require that all structures more 
than 50% damaged be raised to either the base 
flood elevation or three feet higher than the 
adjacent curb – whichever is higher.
While the long term effects of Hurricane Katrina 
are yet to be seen, there is sure to be some effect 
on the City's footprint.  New Orleans has been 
losing population for decades, and this even has 
enhanced that process.
It is likely that regardless of the long term 
population size, the shape of the city will reflect 
those areas that remained dry throughout the 
events of Katrina.  This means that areas such as 
New Orleans East and Gentilly will be less 
populated, while density increases along the 
natural levee of the Mississippi River.
The fires caused the City's footprint to enlarge, 
this was driven both by the desire of people to 
deconcentrate from the confines of the Vieux 
Carré and the influx of immigrants from Europe 
and the newly formed United States.
Response & Recovery Comparisons
Low interest loans were granted to victims of the 
disasters to rebuild their homes and their lives
In 1788, the Spanish officials encouraged 
colonists to rebuild using brick and slate/tile 
roofs rather than wood homes with thatch or 
wood shingles.  After the Fire of 1794, these 
changes became mandatory.
 
Significant Differences between 1788 and 2005 
 There are numerous differences between the situations faced by the 
City of New Orleans of 1788 and 1794 and the City today.  Factors such as 
population growth and the perceived importance of the area will contribute 
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to or detract from the ability of the city to rebound as it did in the wake of 
the disasters of the eighteenth century. 
It is troublesome to compare the overall climate surrounding the 
rebuilding efforts across the centuries.  In the late eighteenth century, 
there was a period of significant growth in the region surrounding New 
Orleans, as we have previously discussed.  This growth led to the creation 
of several Faubourgs surrounding the Vieux Carré.  In 1788 and 1794, the 
Vieux Carré was the only area impacted by the disasters, but it should be 
noted that it was also the only settled area of what would become 
metropolitan New Orleans.   
When Hurricane Katrina roared ashore in 2005, The City of New 
Orleans had been losing population on a consistent basis for in excess of 25 
years.  For example, the US Census Bureau estimates that the City lost 
approximately 45,000 people between 2000 and 2005 (US Census, New 
Orleans Fact Sheet).  This negative growth will likely be a severe detriment 
to the rebuilding efforts in the City of New Orleans.  
For decades, the population of New Orleans has been in decline.  
Failing public schools and climbing crime rates are two factors among 
many driving people out of the City and into the suburbs of Jefferson and 
St. Tammany Parishes.  These areas on the outskirts of New Orleans were 
seen as havens to the middle-class whites that fled the City.  Social, 
economic and racial segregation remained realities in New Orleans long 
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after the Civil Rights era of the 1960’s, not in a governmentally ordained 
fashion, but in practice.  Although the City of New Orleans was more 
integrated more than many American cities before Katrina, there remained 
white neighborhoods, black neighborhoods and specific areas for the rich 
and poor of all races.   It is these aspects of New Orleans that should be 
seriously addressed in the rebuilding of the City of New Orleans. 
Just as Colonial New Orleans learned how to improve upon the past 
in the wake of disaster, so must modern New Orleans.  In the eighteenth 
century, the city leaders mandated that homes be built in a fire-resistant 
way, to prevent the recurrence of major disasters; in the twenty-first 
century we must also look to what changes can be made to prevent 
repeating the past.   
With nearly a year having passed since Hurricane Katrina, the most 
positive guess at the current population of New Orleans is approximately 
250,000 (Russell, 2006).  Prior to the Hurricane, the City population was 
estimated to be just above 437,000, which means that even in the best of 
estimations, nearly 200,000 people have chosen, or not been able to return 
to the City after more than one year of exile (US Census; Russell). 
It should also be noted that in the cases of the fires of 1788 and 1794, 
the residents of the City were simply left vast numbers of homes destroyed, 
not vast numbers of homes destroyed and a depopulated city.  The full 
population of the city was participating in the clean-up that followed each 
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blaze, and the rebuilding of their city was a necessity to life.  Tents were 
distributed to account for the immediate needs of the population, but 
homes were quickly rebuilt to provide a permanent residence.  Hurricane 
Katrina removed nearly 100% of the population of New Orleans, by either 
voluntary or forced evacuation; regardless, there were no citizens present 
for a month or more to force the immediate recovery of their communities.   
In many circumstances, the residents have taken matters into their 
own hands, and have led the rebuilding efforts in the City.  This bottom-up 
charge for rebuilding simply took much longer to get started than it did in 
1788.  For weeks, and in some cases months, the residents of severely 
damaged communities were barred from returning to their neighborhoods, 
leaving the government with the job of both coordinating and performing 
the recovery tasks.  In the environment that was present in Post-Katrina 
New Orleans, the prevailing opinion was that the public would get in the 
way of efforts to clean up the community.  It is not being suggested that the 
City erred in keeping citizens away from the dangers of the overwhelmingly 
flooded metropolis, but simply that there is no one better qualified to clean 
up a neighborhood than its residents.  
In recent months, the long term recovery for communities has fallen 
to neighborhood groups that feel their government has failed them.  Now 
that residents are back, they are looking for ways to revive their 
neighborhoods, and bring back the community with which they were once 
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so familiar.  In 1788, the “planning” as we refer to it today was controlled 
by the Colonial Government, the citizens were crucial to accomplishing the 
actual rebuilding.  Today, many neighborhoods have undertaken their own 
planning efforts to ensure the continued viability of their communities.  
Many proposals have been made for the city as a whole, but none have 
been adopted.     
As a part of the City’s Bring New Orleans Back Final Report the 
Urban Planning Committee included a brief “Why Rebuild?” analysis.  This 
document somewhat overly simplified the reasons to consider rebuilding 
New Orleans, but it remains an interesting item to note.  The Committee 
lists such things as historical and cultural value, petroleum and 
petrochemical production, natural resources such as fisheries and game, 
and the economic and production value of the Port of New Orleans 
(BNOBC, 2) 
More important than the reasons to rebuild is the necessity behind 
such statements being included in a document that is supposed to provide 
a foundation for the recovery of an American City.  It is impossible to know 
if these same debates were waged in 1788 or 1794, but given the historical 
context that the disasters occurred in, it is highly unlikely.   
The situation being faced by New Orleans today is far different from 
what she endured two centuries ago.  In the late eighteenth century, the 
North American continent was still being settled, the United States of 
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America was an upstart nation that challenged their European rule and was 
beginning to expand its borders westward.  Today, the United States is the 
last remaining super-power and is defending its interests, influence and 
borders in dramatically different ways. 
New Orleans was established as a strategic location for the defense of 
“the Mississippi River, all the land drained by the river, and all its 
tributaries” as was claimed by René-Robert Cavelier, sieur de La Salle in 
1682 for France (Eakin, 73).  By 1788, the City of New Orleans was seventy 
years old, and was had become a hub for transportation and trade along 
the Mississippi River.  The location, for commerce and defense was critical 
to maintaining control over the River and the inland interests of the then-
possessors of the territory, Spain.  Had the City been abandoned after 
either of the catastrophic fires of the eighteenth century, the Spanish would 
have essentially abdicated their claim to the territory, since there would no 
longer be a practical way to exert control.   
As we progress into the twenty-first century, the location of New 
Orleans, or even the existence thereof, is not nearly as apparent to her 
home nation as in 1788.  The presence of a line of defense is not necessary 
to ensure territorial possession and travel along the Mississippi River; 
however, The Port of New Orleans remains a hub for commerce, America’s 
natural resources travel from the North, and foreign goods from the South.  
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Many throughout the nation have argued that the rebuilding of New 
Orleans is no more than an exercise in futility, since such an event is likely 
to happen again, maybe not next year, or the year after but at some point in 
the future.  Perhaps the multi-billion dollar investment that will be 
required of the federal government would be better spent on using the 
power of eminent domain to simply vacate the city, but only time will truly 
tell.  New Orleans does sit below sea-level, in its lowest parts up to fifteen 
feet below sea level, and it is sinking.  So, it could be said that the 
government is throwing money into a bottomless pit that gets deeper every 
day.  This is not the first catastrophic event to have befallen this city, nor 
will it be the last, but the answer does not lie in abandonment, but rather in 
protection.   
Table 5.3
Fire Flood
In the 1700’s, all assistance and decisions were 
local – there was no way for the City to have 
even asked for help in a timely fashion
By relying on the state and federal government to 
provide this assistance, vital time was lost in both 
providing help to those stranded at shelters and 
those trapped throughout the city by rising 
floodwaters.
This disaster occurred at a time of rapid growth 
and expansion, allowing for the rapid recovery of 
devastated areas and growth into new ones.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans was 
losing population.  This disaster is likely to 
enhance this loss.  In August,2005 the 
population was estimated at 437,000 residents, 
in November, 2006 the population estimate is 
~200,000.
In the late eighteenth century into the early 
nineteenth, New Orleans, like all of America was 
seeing rapid immigration from many areas, 
especially Europe.
Since Hurricane Katrina, there has been a rapid 
influx of Latin American workers into New 
Orleans and the Gulf Coast.  It is too soon to 
determine if this population will remain in the 
City, or if this is temporary growth spurred by 
the availability of jobs in this market.
Response & Recovery Contrasts
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Cultural and Social Differences 
 When the fires consumed the City of New Orleans in the eighteenth 
century, the city was at a turning point in its social and cultural 
development.  After nearly a century of domination by France and Spain, 
the population was becoming more diverse, and the cultural landscape was 
being modified to reflect that diversity.  In the late eighteenth century, 
Louisiana saw an influx of population in the form of the Acadians, exiled 
from Canada and resettling in the bayous of Louisiana.  Towards the end of 
the eighteenth century, the City saw its population grow as a result of the 
migration of immigrants from around the world.  Many free people of color 
began to arrive from the Caribbean at the same time that Americans were 
starting to settle the area around New Orleans as a strategic trading post.  
Also immigrating in this era were those of European descent, such as 
Germans and the Irish (Wall, 70-71).   
 As was previously discussed, for many years preceding Hurricane 
Katrina, New Orleans was a city that was hemorrhaging population.  Since 
Katrina, however, the City has seen a new wave of immigration, nearly to 
the scale of that seen in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  In the 
four months immediately following Hurricane Katrina over 100,000 
Hispanic people migrated to the Gulf Coast in pursuit of employment.  
These migrant workers seem to hail from all parts of Latin America, with 
many coming specifically from Mexico.  So many in fact, that the Mexican 
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government is exploring the possibility of reconstituting the now-dormant 
Mexican consulate in New Orleans (Waller, 2006).   
Immigrants from Latin American nations have come to New Orleans 
seeking employment; these people – for better or for worse – are willing to 
put in long hours for low pay.  Most of the population that has found its 
way to New Orleans is male, and it is believed that many may migrate out 
of the City as work wanes and the City gets back on its feet.  There should 
be no doubt that at least a portion of this population will remain in New 
Orleans, and start a new chapter in her urban development.   
 In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, American and 
European immigration forever changed the way New Orleans looked and 
behaved.  As the Americans came from the north to utilize the Mississippi 
as a trade route, they began settling to take advantage of the relative 
closeness to the mouth of the river and the natural deepwater port that was 
New Orleans.  German and Irish immigrants made their way to the City 
around the same time that they began flowing into other sections of North 
America.  
 The Germans and Irish “formed the city’s white lower classes” 
(Lewis, 45) and were the primary original inhabitants of the Faubourg 
Marigny.  This settlement pattern had more to do with the separation of 
cultures than anything else, the Creole population of New Orleans, residing 
in the Vieux Carré, wanted nothing to do with these newly arrived people, 
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nor did the immigrants want anything to do with the existing population.  
The language division certainly exacerbated the divide between the 
inhabitants and immigrants, and this same divisive settlement pattern 
progresses still today.  In the mid-twentieth century, New Orleans saw an 
influx of Vietnamese immigrants; this group still exists in cultural enclaves 
around the metropolitan area, the most predominant of which are the 
Versailles and Village de L’est subdivisions in New Orleans East, an area 
heavily damaged by Katrina’s floodwaters.  This group has not only 
remained closely bound over as much as three generations, but has become 
a force in post-Katrina politics, and a model of cooperative community 
rebuilding.   
It is too soon to determine if the next wave of New Orleans 
immigrants will follow this same pattern.  The difference in this situation is 
that this group moved to the city en masse, and has found housing 
wherever it was available.  However, this housing is generally highly priced 
and rental, meaning that as the newly arrived Hispanic immigrants to New 
Orleans make the decision to commit to the City, there may be a growing 
trend of Spanish-speaking people forming communities in redeveloping 
areas.  With the scale of devastation in areas like New Orleans East and the 
Lower Ninth Ward, there is no way to guess conclusively who will reside in 
these areas in the coming years, and how they will be reshaped.  Although 
both suffered severe damage, the Lakeview and Gentilly communities seem 
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to have a higher rate of return than is being seen in the other heavily 
damaged areas of the City.  Residents in these areas are more likely not 
only to have had insurance, but also to have had adequate insurance to 
return their homes to pre-disaster conditions.   
Disaster has a way of changing both form and function in a 
community.  Prior to the disastrous fires, most buildings in the City were 
made of wood.  After these disasters, the Cabildo created a fire code to 
prevent large scale disasters from again consuming the community.  
Structures changed from wood to brick construction, with roofing of slate 
rather than wood or thatch.  This was seen as a key measure in protecting 
the citizens and the Royal investment in rebuilding.  Another measure that 
was seen as crucial to the lasting survival of eighteenth century New 
Orleans was the deconcentration of the Vieux Carré.  In the wake of the 
first fire, the Faubourg Ste. Marie was created just upriver from the old 
city, and after the second fire the Faubourg Marigny was established 
downriver.   
As New Orleans moves on from the devastation of Hurricane 
Katrina, we are seeing significant shifting in how we recreate the built 
environment of the community to reflect the lessons and needs of the 
twenty-first century.  For years, New Orleans has relied on the flood 
protection system that was supposed to protect it from becoming an 
American Venice.  This assumption was physically demonstrated in the 
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shift from the raised construction of the earlier centuries to the slab-on-
grade construction of the mid-twentieth century.  Slab homes were as 
much a product of rapid suburbanization as pre-fabricated construction.  
While not debating the concept of slab-on-grade and pre-fabricated 
construction methods, these may not have been the best path to follow in 
the New Orleans area.  Earlier building styles incorporated open areas 
under homes to allow for flooding in the unpredictable environment of 
New Orleans.  Whether this was accomplished by using pilings or brick 
‘chain-walls’ the result was in keeping homes safe from the street flooding 
that was common before pumping systems and outfall canals became the 
norm. 
As New Orleans is reconstructed, older homes are being raised to 
prevent repetitive loss by flood even if not required to do so by the newly 
enacted flood standards.  There is ongoing debate nationally and locally 
regarding the action and policy decisions being made in the reconstruction 
of New Orleans.  To the City’s defense, it is hard to make policies to 
adequately protect citizens when those above are controlling the resources.  
The devastation was caused by a failure of the federally-funded hurricane 
protection levees, not the storm itself; and until a decision is made from 
Washington, D.C. regarding the future of hurricane protection in New 
Orleans, local leaders are left to making best-guess decisions on what fate 
the future may hold. 
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New architecture, while reflective of the unique style of New Orleans, 
is being designed with flood-loss control in mind.  How New Orleans will 
look in ten years is open to debate.  Many people want to retain the 
appearance of New Orleans architecture as the city reconstitutes itself, but 
others want to see more innovative design options made available in the 
community.  Immediate housing is necessary to spur the redevelopment of 
communities, and people cannot be expected to live in their FEMA-
provided travel-trailers until permanent housing can be found.  Factory-
built modular housing has become one option on the rebuilding 
smorgasbord.  These homes are being designed to both be elevated and be 
complementary to more traditional forms of New Orleans architecture.  
Many residents are weighing their rebuilding options.  Modular homes are 
being offered at lower prices and in much less time than traditionally built 
homes, but the sacrifice is in having a standardized design, both internally 
and externally (Meitrodt, 2006 b). 
New Orleans has a history, and a certain aura that surrounds her 
neighborhoods.  This atmosphere is created as much by the physical as the 
human characteristics of individual communities.  There seems to be a 
preoccupation in New Orleans with trying to put everything back to where 
it was on August 28, 2005, without addressing the reality of what occurred 
on August 29.  New Orleans is a different city, and this reality needs to be 
recognized and embraced; however, the residents of New Orleans need not 
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let the rushing floodwaters wash away that which makes the community 
unique.  Not only has debate circulated around the architectural future of 
New Orleans, but on the function of that architecture as well.   
The city in its original, organic form was reflective of what has 
become known as “new urbanism.”  Over the years New Orleans, like other 
cities, adopted the suburban, car-dependent model of development.  Many 
would like to see New Orleans return to its original shape, rather than 
rebuilding the stretches of suburbia were indicative of development in the 
Post World War II era around New Orleans.  This shift in form would 
coincide with the shift in functionality and architectural styling.  In many 
areas across the Gulf Coast, including New Orleans, self-proclaimed “urban 
designers” have tried to recreate the ambiance of Magazine Street but with 
the promises of retailers like the The Gap and Williams-Sonoma 
populating these storefronts instead of neighborhood pizzerias and used 
record shops.  While the ideas of mixed use corridors serve the functions of 
bringing more people to higher grounds and increasing walkability these 
changes will, in many places, cause the urban fabric of the City to be 
compromised in a more serious way than the storm that brought them 
about (MacCash, 2005).   
Architecturally, the city needs to look to find a modern compromise 
of blending the past and the present.  Much ado has been made about the 
need to build sustainable, green communities to bring us into the future.  
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Such recommendations have based their suggestions on how communities 
survived in the past.  With the technological innovations of the past 
century, we have surrendered the knowledge of how to live without air-
conditioning and the other amenities of daily life in 2006.  High ceilings 
and double-hung windows were a staple of New Orleans and Caribbean 
architecture in the past, these two particular features allowed buildings to 
remain at a comfortable temperature during even the most intense of 
summer days.  The compromise that must be made would particularly 
involve maintaining the features of the past that can help us weather 
another storm, while not making the City of New Orleans look like it’s an 
extension of Disneyland.  The difference between true New Orleans 
architecture and mass produced variations on it are noticeable to anyone 
who has come across some recent New Orleans developments.   
The footprint of the city has been a hot-button issue since the Urban 
Land Institute (ULI) made the infamous “shrinking footprint” 
recommendation to the Bring New Orleans Back Commission in November 
of 2005.  In this report, ULI recommended that the redevelopment of New 
Orleans be focused on the natural levees along the Mississippi River and 
other naturally higher ground in the City.  This proposal left vast tracts of 
green space throughout the City to serve as floodplain area as well as 
parkland.  While this may have been a rationalized approach to the 
rebuilding of a devastated community, this proposal allowed for no 
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consideration for the property owners whose houses were slated to be 
parkland (Urban Land Institute, 2005). 
As the city approached the year 1800, fire had consumed most of the 
original city of New Orleans and how these disasters physically shaped the 
city became clearer with every passing day.  The boundaries of New 
Orleans were expanding, not only to meet the needs of the growing 
immigrant population, but because the concentration of the Vieux Carré 
was seen as risk factor in the prevention of another sweeping conflagration.   
While the suggestion is not being made that concentrating the city 
will prevent catastrophic flooding, what is being suggested is that future 
development will likely be in those areas located on the natural levee of the 
Mississippi, which received no flooding during Hurricane Katrina.  Figure 
5.3 (page 67) illustrates the area where future development is primarily 
being encouraged.  Local leadership is encouraging people to rebuild and 
repopulate all areas of the city, including those areas east of the Industrial 
Canal.  From the rebuilding proposals that have been drafted for the City, 
the naturally higher ground near the Mississippi River provides at least a 
sense of safety from floods that may be lacking in other parts of the 
community.   
  The City of New Orleans has taken the position of letting the market drive 
what areas will be revived.  By allowing the market to drive the where the 
city places its limited resources, people are given a greater opportunity to 
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determine where they want to resettle, be that in their formerly flooded 
neighborhoods or on the higher ground of the levee.  This policy could 
result in favoring those areas with the economic ability to rebuild en masse, 
leaving those in areas with lower rates of return with sub-standard city 
services.  Over the course of the fifteen months since Hurricane Katrina’s 
wrath struck the City, officials have been unable, or unwilling to make 
decisions regarding the future of specific areas.  The result of the Unified 
New Orleans Plan, which is slated to be a city-wide compilation of 
neighborhood plans,  is expected by the early part of 2007, if adopted this 
plan will allow residents to make an informed decision about the future of 
their own communities, and will aid the City in deciding where to place 
resources. 
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Figure 5.3: 1878 New Orleans footprint versus 2005 flood depths. 
 
Source: The Times-Picayunne, November 3, 2005 
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Chapter VI 
Conclusion 
What Can History Teach Us? 
 There are numerous lessons that should be learned from the past 
experiences of New Orleans.  The history of disaster recovery in general 
would not help this city in the same way that the history of New Orleans 
can guide the direction that the City should take from this point.  New 
Orleans is a unique, organic community in that it started off as a small 
French settlement in 1718 in the most unlikely and unwelcoming of 
locations and grew to encompass the history and traditions of people from 
around the world that have made their way there.  Even in the melting pot 
that is America, New Orleans has maintained its own personality.  As a 
community, New Orleans has not adopted the generalized mainstream 
traditions and celebrations that are found throughout the vast nation of 
which it is a part, but rather it has retained its own ideas and forced those 
entering to accept the New Orleans way rather than bending to the ways of 
the outside.   
Through the years New Orleans has been required to fall in line with 
outside forces, but even compliance with these policies New Orleans has 
done it her own way.  In the late eighteenth century the Spanish 
Administration required that traditional New Orleans building style of 
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wood be abandoned and brick used in its place; in response New Orleans 
absorbed these Spanish building styles and made them its own.  It is 
doubtless that a similar process will be repeated in the twenty-first century; 
the new building codes and flood elevations will also likely be amalgamated 
into the unique fabric that is New Orleans.  The disasters of 1788 and 1794 
were substantially different from that of 2005, but in many ways the same.   
Both relocated large portions of the population; both, by their very nature, 
have left deep scars in the social and cultural fabric of the community; and 
both have affected the course of future events of a Great American City. 
Disasters force change that is a fact that cannot be escaped 
regardless of the uniqueness of a community.  What the uniqueness does 
aid in is how gracefully that community can pick itself up and look to the 
future with its head high.  New Orleans is just such a place.  The disastrous 
events of two hundred years ago may exist on the margins of history, but 
remembering their lessons would benefit us today.  There are numerous 
factors that guide the direction in which a city is moving at any given time, 
but rarely do those factors converge into one historical turning point.  
March 21, 1788 and August 29, 2005 were certainly two of those rare 
occasions.  
Life has become far more complicated in the interim two centuries 
between the disasters, but certain truths hold true.  We have seen that over 
the centuries, a government’s responsibility to its citizens has stayed 
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relatively constant.  Food and shelter for victims of disaster is, and should 
be, a top priority; but the true government impact comes as the community 
begins to rebuild.  The first action taken is to attempt to prevent a 
reoccurrence of the event.  In 1788 this included the creation of building 
codes to require brick rather than wood construction, and in 2006 the 
raising houses to comply with redrawn Base Flood Elevation maps, the 
construction of flood-gates and improved pumping systems, and more 
stringent building codes.   
Following mitigation measures set in place by the government, and 
agencies such as FEMA and the National Flood Insurance Program, the 
community must now come together and determine collectively where they 
would like to be in the future; the most critical element that must be 
present is the determination to restore their community; not specifically 
the physical aspect, but the social and cultural ones.   
No one knows how New Orleans will recover from Katrina, but what 
is sure is that she will.  The footprint may be larger or smaller, 
Tchoupitoulas may be pronounced with more if a Spanish accent, and 
perhaps Calliope will be pronounced more like the steam-instrument than 
a hybrid melon.  What is certain about the future of this great, iconic city is 
that there are brighter days ahead, and that by learning from past events 
we will not have to endure those hardships again.  There will always be 
hurricanes, but there are also still fires; the key is knowing how to 
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minimize the effect of the disaster.  Through exploring the past, we can 
learn the value of ancestral knowledge and how to overcome adversity be it 
in the form of Fire or Flood.  
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